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Table 3 Combined payoffs matrix

From: When honesty and cheating pay off: the evolution of honest and dishonest equilibria in a conventional signalling game

   Opponent strength
    Strong    Weak  
Ego Strength Attack Cond. attack Flee Attack Cond. attack Flee
  Attack 0.5 VC SS 0.5 VC SS V-F A V-C SW V-C SW V-F A
Strong Cond. attack 0.5 VC SS -F P 0.5 VC SS V V-C SW -F P V-C SW V
  Flee (S00) - C SS 0 0.5 V C SS - C SW 0 0.5 V
  Flee (SS09) - C SS  + F f 0 0.5 V C SS - C SW  + F f 0 0.5 V
  Flee (H13) - C SS 0 0.5 V - C SW 0 0.5 V
  Attack -C WS -C WS V-F A 0.5 VC WW 0.5 VC WW V-F A
  Cond. attack -C WS -F P -C WS V 0.5 VC WW -F P 0.5 VC WW V
Weak Flee (S00) - C WS 0 0.5 V - C WW 0 0.5 V C WW
  Flee (SS09) - C WS  + F f 0 0.5 V - C WW  + F f 0 0.5 V C WW
  Flee (H13) - C WS 0 0.5 V - C WW 0 0.5 V
  1. Bold letters denote differences in pay-offs in the Flee choice: Flee(S00) Számadó [24], Flee(SS09) Szalai & Számadó [25], Flee(H13) Helgesen et al., [42]. V: value of the contested resource; C SS , C WW : expected cost of fight between equal opponents; C SW : cost for strong individual to beat weak one; C WS : cost to weak individual when beaten by strong one; F f : cost of fleeing; F A : cost of attacking fleeing opponent; F P : cost of waiting if the opponent attacks unconditionally