BMC Ecology and Evolution

Table 3 Combined payoffs matrix

From: When honesty and cheating pay off: the evolution of honest and dishonest equilibria in a conventional signalling game

		Opponent strength
			Strong			Weak
Ego Strength		Attack	Cond. attack	Flee	Attack	Cond. attack	Flee
	Attack	0.5 V–C _SS	0.5 V–C _SS	V-F _A	V-C _SW	V-C _SW	V-F _A
Strong	Cond. attack	0.5 V–C _SS-F _P	0.5 V–C _SS	V	V-C _SW-F _P	V-C _SW	V
	Flee (S00)	*- C* _SS	0	0.5 V – C _SS	- C _SW	0	0.5 V
	Flee (SS09)	*- C* _SS *+ F* _f	0	0.5 V – C _SS	- C _SW *+ F* _f	0	0.5 V
	Flee (H13)	*- C* _SS	0	0.5 V	- C _SW	0	0.5 V
	Attack	-C _WS	-C _WS	V-F _A	0.5 V–C _WW	0.5 V–C _WW	V-F _A
	Cond. attack	-C _WS-F _P	-C _WS	V	0.5 V–C _WW-F _P	0.5 V–C _WW	V
Weak	Flee (S00)	- C _WS	0	0.5 V	- C _WW	0	0.5 V – C _WW
	Flee (SS09)	- C _WS + F _f	0	0.5 V	- C _WW *+ F* _f	0	0.5 V – C _WW
	Flee (H13)	- C _WS	0	0.5 V	- C _WW	0	0.5 V

Bold letters denote differences in pay-offs in the Flee choice: Flee(S00) Számadó [24], Flee(SS09) Szalai & Számadó [25], Flee(H13) Helgesen et al., [42]. V: value of the contested resource; C _SS, C _WW: expected cost of fight between equal opponents; C _SW: cost for strong individual to beat weak one; C _WS: cost to weak individual when beaten by strong one; F _f: cost of fleeing; F _A: cost of attacking fleeing opponent; F _P: cost of waiting if the opponent attacks unconditionally

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ISSN: 2730-7182

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